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Miller, the Prerogative and Constitutional Change  
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh 
University of Edinburgh 
The Supreme Court’s decision in January 2017 was a significant one in many respects 
covering much constitutional ground on prerogative powers, the effects of EU Membership 
on the UK constitution, the relationship between parliament and the devolved 
administrations, referendums in the UK and other issues besides.  This contribution will focus 
on one of the two main issues in the judgment; that of the prerogative powers of the 
executive under the constitution and in particular their relationship to domestic EU legislation 
and the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) in particular (the other main issue being the 
devolution questions).1 
 It will provide a brief summary of the relevant rules regulating the prerogative 
considered in the case along with how they were applied by the UKSC, arguing that the 
contorted logic of the majority in the case in applying the common law rules regulating the 
exercise of the prerogative are evidence that they  were not the real grounds upon which the 
case was decided. Rather, the substantive reasons for the majority finding that the 
government lacked the constitutional authority to give Art. 50 notification in the absence of 
statutory authority was the newly minted principle of major constitutional change by 
legislation, based on the unique circumstances surrounding the reception and effect of EU 
law on the UK constitution. 
 
1. The rules regarding the Prerogative 
                                                     
1 See Mullen, in this volume. 
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Prerogative powers are executive powers which do not owe their origin to legislation or 
the common law but are a legacy of the original powers of the monarch under medieval 
constitutional arrangements.  Whereas they are commonly criticised for their seemingly 
undemocratic nature, the most important powers are now exercised by the government.  The 
particular prerogative power at issue in Miller was the power to conduct foreign relations, in 
particular the power to sign treaties which, the UKSC found, also implied a power to withdraw 
from or terminate treaties.2  Generally speaking such a power is exercisable without reference 
to legislation (because of the UK constitution’s dualist approach to international law) and is 
not judicially reviewable.3   
However, as with any prerogative power, the power to sign and withdraw from treaties 
could be affected both by statute and by common law rules.  At issue in Miller was whether 
this power had been affected by EU-related legislation passed during the UK’s EU membership 
and in particular the Act which gave effect to that membership in the first place; the ECA.  In 
order to determine that issue, the Court had to apply the standard common law rules 
regulating the relationship between prerogative powers and statutes: 
 Prerogative powers cannot be used to change the law 
 Prerogative powers can be curtailed or restricted by statute 
 Prerogative powers cannot be used to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of a 
statute. 
 
Prerogative powers cannot be exercised to alter the law  
                                                     
2 Miller, at [54. 
3 Miller, at [55]. 
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The idea that prerogative powers cannot be used to change the law dates back at least to the 
Case of Proclamations of 1610.4  The precise question at issue was whether the exercise of 
the prerogative of signing/withdrawing from treaties to give notification under Art. 50 TEU 
could be said to be changing the law in the relevant sense of the rule.  There are two elements 
to this question:  the first is practical ; the second relates to what counts as ‘law’ for the 
purposes of the rule.   
 The practical question concerns whether triggering Art. 50 in fact changes domestic 
law.5  On one reading, triggering Art. 50 itself does not change, repeal or affect the continued 
validity and operation of, for example, the ECA.  It would remain in force and have full effect 
until it is either repealed, or the time limit in Art. 50 runs out depriving some of the rights 
granted by EU law of effect.  This was the view taken by the minority who added that during 
the two year process, the executive will be accountable to parliament for its actions.6    
The majority, by contrast, found that changes in the law which would eventually occur on the 
lapse of the time period in Art. 50 could be imputed to the exercise of the prerogative to 
effect notification of withdrawal under Art. 50.  They endorsed a metaphor employed by the 
applicants, likening the triggering of Art. 50 to a bullet leaving a gun which will sooner or later 
hit a target once the trigger is pulled,  which will result changes to current law as  individuals 
will be deprived of certain EU-derived rights once the UK formally ceases to be a Member.7  
As such, given the significant constitutional implications of leaving the EU in terms of the 
‘switching off’ of a hitherto important source of law under the constitution, partly reflected 
                                                     
4 12 Co Rep 74. 
5 See C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Brexit’s Legal Stumble’, European Futures, 4 November 2016.  Available at:  
http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-4371 
6 Miller, at [259]. 
7 Miller, at [36]. 
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in the ECA’s ‘constitutional character’,8 the Art. 50 notification could be seen as changing the 
law for the purpose of the common law rules regulating the prerogative.9 
 Both these positions, however, rested on the presumption that Art. 50 is not 
revocable.  If it were revocable, this issue would have been much more complex, as the 
majority could not say with the same certainty that the mere act of notifying under Art. 50 
would  in fact result in changes in the law in the cutting off of EU law and EU-derived rights.  
However the Court proceeded on the basis that Art. 50 notification was not revocable,10 and 
neither party sought to argue otherwise. 
 The second aspect of this question relates to what counts as ‘law’ for the purposes of 
the rule.  Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Miller judgment, and the issue which 
most clearly divided the majority from the minority, was the question of what impact EU 
membership had on the constitution and what status EU law had as a source of law.  This 
issue became a leitmotif of the judgment.   The majority accorded EU law a quasi-mythical 
status, arriving at a position which seemed almost to take the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s (CJEU) constitutionalising judgments at face value.  As is well known, these judgments 
claimed a boot-strapped authority for EU law which did not rely on domestic implementing 
provisions for its authority and effectiveness and was supreme in cases of conflict with 
domestic law.11  This position has been largely refuted by national courts (including the UKSC 
itself)12 which asserted that EU law was valid and effective only by virtue of provisions of 
                                                     
8 Miller, at [67]. 
9 Miller, at [81], [83]. 
10 Miller, at [26]. 
11 See C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘The European Union’s Constitutional Mosaic:  Big ‘C’ or Small ‘c’, Is that the 
Question?’ in N. Walker, J. Shaw & S. Tierney, Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic, (Hart, 2011). 
12 For example, in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 
324. 
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national constitutional law.13   This has given rise to a theorisation of the relationship between 
EU and domestic courts in terms of constitutional pluralism which posits EU law and state 
constitutional law as two autonomous legal systems which do not rely on each other for their 
validity.14  In Miller, the UKSC seemed to backtrack on this ‘pluralist’ view. It found that EU 
law constituted an ‘entirely new, independent and overriding source of domestic law’15 and 
that the CJEU was a ‘source of binding judicial decisions about its meaning.’16  The novelty in 
the majority’s position in Miller was not that it considered EU law an independent source of 
law (after all, it will clearly continue to exist post-Brexit) but that it considered it an 
independent source of domestic law, seemingly independent of any domestic implementing 
provisions such as the ECA.  For the majority, then, notwithstanding ample rhetoric to the 
contrary in its reasoning,17 substantively it is UK withdrawal from the EU, rather than the 
repeal of the ECA, which would have the effect of changing the law.  Given that this was an 
inevitable result of an Art. 50 notification, legislation was required to effect this change.       
The minority, led by Lord Reed, took the more conventional pluralist view of EU law 
finding that the rule about changing the law related to domestic UK law only.  Given that EU 
law was not an independent source of domestic law, but only had effects through the ECA, 
triggering Art. 50 would not change the law in the relevant sense as triggering Art. 50 would 
not change the ECA.18 
 
                                                     
13 A proposition which was given statutory footing in s. 18 of the European Union Act 2011. 
14 See C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘The Anatomy of Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union’ in G. Davies & M. 
Avbelj (eds.), Research Handbook on Pluralism and EU Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).  Available at:  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985303. 
15 Miller, at [80]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Miller, at [62], [65], [67]. 
18 Miller, at [219]. 
 6 
Prerogative powers can be curtailed or abrogated by statute.   
Where statutory provisions and prerogative powers cover the same subject matter, the 
statute will always prevail.  The central case here is De Keyser’s Royal Hotel where concurrent 
statutory and prerogative powers to commandeer property in wartime existed with different 
rules on compensation and the Court found that where concurrent regulation existed, the 
prerogative power could not be exercised, and the statutory power must be used.19   
 In Miller the issue effectively related to whether the ECA already envisaged 
withdrawal from the EU.  If so, then the prerogative power to sign and withdraw from treaties 
in the EU context would be superseded by that statutory power.  It was common ground that 
the ECA itself did not explicitly refer to a power to withdraw from the EU. The majority framed 
the question in terms of ‘occupying the field’; i.e. where it could be said that the statute had 
‘occupied’ the same ‘field’ as the prerogative power, then the statute would prevail.  However 
the question of what, precisely, ‘occupying the field’ entails was not clarified by the majority. 
The issue was further complicated by the fact that the Court found that an express reference 
to the prerogative power for the purpose of the rule was not necessary.  Prerogative powers 
could be curtailed by ‘necessary implication’.20 
 Whatever the relevant field was in the case, the majority seems to have simply 
assumed it had been occupied by the ECA.  It held that had the power to withdraw from the 
EU survived the enactment of the ECA, this would have to have been positively created in an 
Act itself.21  However the majority’s reasoning is not easy to follow here.  Why should the 
creation of a new domestic source of law pursuant to the EU Treaties necessitate an express 
                                                     
19 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508  
 
20 Miller, at [48]. 
21 Miller, at [86]. 
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statutory power to withdraw from those Treaties? This approach seems to mis-apply the rule, 
which suggests that the prerogative exists until such time as it is restricted or curtailed by 
parliament; if it is not so curtailed or restricted, then the power continues to exist.  The 
majority’s approach seems to turn this logic on its head. Part of the justification for finding 
that the ECA had occupied the field of withdrawal was based on the rule in ex parte Simms 
that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general words in a statute because 
Parliament must ‘squarely confront what it is doing’ in overriding rights.22  Accordingly, the 
majority could not accept that Parliament had ‘squarely confronted’ the notion that ‘it was 
clothing ministers with the far-reaching and anomalous right to use a treaty-making power to 
remove an important source of domestic law and important domestic rights’23.  However it 
came to this view by implying rather than arguing for the contention that the ECA had clearly 
occupied the field of withdrawing from the EU, mainly based on the unique status of EU law 
and the ECA. Reconstructing the majority’s argument to fit the rule would entail the argument 
that the ECA introduced a significant new source of domestic law and that the relevant ‘field’ 
for the purposes of the application of this rule was the existence and continued effectiveness 
of this source of law - a field which necessarily encompassed the power to extinguish and 
render ineffective this source of law.  Hence, as the majority concluded, s. 2 ECA ‘does not 
envisage [EU law] rights changing as a result of ministers unilaterally deciding that the United 
Kingdom should withdraw from the EU Treaties.’24  However this was not particularly clearly 
explained in the majority’s opinion. 
The minority’s position on this question is clearer.  Firstly, Lord Reed found that there 
was nothing in the ECA which suggested that Parliament intended to ‘occupy’ the field of 
                                                     
22 Miller, at [87]. 
23 Miller, at [87]. 
24 Miller, at [83]. 
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withdrawal from the EU treaties.  Whereas the ECA recognises the existence of Art. 50 TEU 
through the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which introduced the provision, the ECA did not 
say anything about ‘how or by whom a decision to invoke article 50 should be taken’.25   
Furthermore, Lord Reed pointed to various instances where Parliament had expressly 
fettered the exercise of prerogative treaty-making powers in respect of the EU, such as the 
Parliamentary Elections Act 1978 and the European Union Amendment Act 2008.26  The 
implication, according to the minority, was therefore that had parliament intended to restrict 
the exercise of the prerogative power to withdraw from the treaties in respect of withdrawing 
from the EU, it would have done so expressly.   
 
Prerogative powers cannot frustrate the purpose of a statute by emptying it of content or 
preventing its effectual operation  
The rule that prerogative powers cannot be used to frustrate the purpose of a statute 
is similar to the previous one and much of the analysis in the case overlapped.  However, it is 
potentially broader than the restriction or curtailment rule in that even if a statute and a 
prerogative power don’t explicitly occupy the same field, any consequence of the exercise of 
a prerogative power which has the effect of frustrating the purpose of a statute could fall foul 
of the rule.  For example, Laker Airways held that a prerogative power to amend an 
international treaty could not be exercised where its effect was to make the holding of a 
statutory licence useless.27   
 Early in the judgment, the majority identified the purpose of the ECA as being to allow 
the UK to become a (now EU) member state.  They contended that such a purpose could not 
                                                     
25 Miller, at [233]. 
26 Miller, at [206-7]. 
27 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643. 
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be reconciled with the existence of a prerogative power to make the UK cease to be an EU 
member.28  This implied that the lack of a specific intention to withdraw from the EU in any 
subsequent EU-related legislation meant that all subsequent EU-related Acts were in 
harmony with this particular ‘constitutional’ purpose of the ECA,29 even including the 2015 
EU Referendum Act which paved the way for the Brexit referendum.  Given that the Act did 
not specify what was to happen in the event of a leave vote, its purposes were limited to 
either the holding of a referendum, or was enveloped in the more general purposes of EU-
related Acts and particularly the ECA namely to become and remain a member of the 
organisation.30 
 The minority found that the rule restricting the exercise of prerogative from 
frustrating the will of Parliament was not entirely relevant here as the rule presupposed the 
existence of a prerogative power whereas the issue at stake in the Miller decision was 
whether such a power existed in the first place.31  Furthermore, the minority argued that the 
purposes of the 2015 Referendum Act could be interpreted as including the purpose of 
withdrawing from the EU such that the exercise of prerogative in this field would not frustrate 
its purposes.32  
 
2. EU law , the UK Constitution and the Principle of Constitutional Change by 
Legislation 
Somewhat ironically, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Miller judgment was the 
deliberation on the nature and status of EU law under the UK constitution, and the role of the 
                                                     
28 Miller, at [88]. 
29 Miller, at [108-109]. 
30 Miller, at [119]. 
31 Miller, at [266]. 
32 Miller, at [267]. 
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ECA in supporting that status; ironic because of all the uncertainties surrounding Brexit, 
perhaps the least uncertain thing is that the ECA itself will (probably) be repealed.    
As is clear from the discussion above, in some ways the case was less about the 
prerogative and more about the constitutional status of the EU law and the ECA and the 
implications of changing this status.  The majority’s rather contorted reasoning on the 
application of the rules surrounding the prerogative seems to suggest a different basis for its 
conclusion.  It was its emphasis on the significance of EU law and the ECA in the UK 
constitutional firmament, and the sheer scale of the constitutional change that Brexit 
involves, that led towards the majority espousing, sotto voce, a new principle that major 
constitutional change must be effected by legislation.  The justification for this principle in its 
own terms, and finding that it existed in the constitution, is nebulous.33  The majority relied 
on vague statements that the constitution ‘recognised’34 that major constitutional change 
could only happen through legislation, which was based on ‘long-standing and fundamental 
principle’.35  Nevertheless, this principle, threadbare as its details are, creates a much more 
logical and coherent justification for the majority’s conclusion than the common rules 
regarding the prerogative and the relationship between prerogative and statute.   
 
3. Conclusion 
It is the unique status of the EU as a quasi-federal constitutional entity, its deep impact 
on the domestic constitutions of its member states, and the equally seismic changes resulting 
from withdrawal from membership, which best explains the inchoate and at times incoherent 
                                                     
33 For a robust critique of both the origins of the principle and its potential application in the future see, Elliott, 
Mark, ‘The Supreme Court's Judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional Principle’ forthcoming (2017) 
Cambridge Law Journal. 
34 Miller, at [82] 
35 Miller, at [81]. 
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reasoning of the majority in concluding that legislation was needed to commence the process 
of withdrawal.  Whilst not quite on a par with other potential constitutional ruptures such as 
Scotland becoming independent, it certainly comes close.  The shifts in constitutional politics 
over the past decade or so have left judges and commentators alike grasping to fill the gaps 
in the UK’s constitutional architecture.  In very British fashion, these holes are covered as and 
when they arise.  This reputed flexibility was also evident in the Miller decision.  Whilst the 
majority judgment can be faulted on a number of counts, not least for seeming to pull a 
constitutional principle out of a hat, perhaps in the broader scheme of things it could be said 
to be in line with the generally pragmatic approach to constitutional development in the UK. 
During these turbulent constitutional times, the constitution works overtime to ensure that 
change occurs in ways which respect the fundamental normative principles which underpin 
it, even if this involves sleights of hand such as the development of a new principles that major 
constitutional change requires statutory authorisation.   
 
 
  
